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Abstract
This paper structurally models and estimates the employment effects of minimum wages in inflexible labor
markets with fixed employment costs. When there are fixed costs associated with employment, minimum
wage regulation not only results in a reduction in employment among low productivity workers but also
shifts the distribution of hours for the available jobs in the market, resulting in scarcity of part-time jobs.
Thus, for sufficiently high employment costs, a minimum wage makes it less likely for "marginal" workers
to enter and stay in the labor market and has important employment effects. I estimate the model using
survey data from Turkey. I find significant reduction in employment due to the loss of part time jobs caused
by the national minimum wage policy in this highly inflexible labor market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most research on minimum wages concentrates on the labor market movements on the margin
of employment. Analyses are done to either recover the ratio of workers losing their jobs when the
minimum wage increases or the ratio of individuals who are motivated by higher wages to get a job.
This paper provides a framework that makes it possible to look at the effects of minimum wages on
a variety of labor market outcomes, including but not limited to employment. It shows that having
a minimum wage in an inflexible labor market can potentially eliminate jobs with flexible short
workweeks, or part-time jobs. This not only reduces employment but also increases the average
hours worked in the labor market. This paper also provides a framework which can incorporate
minimum wage non-compliance, and informal job markets as alternatives to formal markets as a
source of flexibility for marginal workers.
The data used in this paper comes from Turkey, where the minimum wage is binding for a
significant portion of workers and there is little or no wiggle room for employers to mitigate the
effects of the minimum wage. In many developing countries, the level of the minimum wage is set
as a living wage for a family, not for an individual, as the main target group is the male breadwinner.
Thus, the employment effects would be expected to have different dimensions than what is addressed
by the existing literature.
This paper isolates the minimum wage, and studies its effect on individuals’ participation de-
cisions when combined with other labor market "inflexibilities" using micro data. The effect of
institutional inflexibilities on employment is studied extensively in the European context, for exam-
ple, by Bertola (1990) and Blanchard and Jimeno (1995), in attempts to explain high unemployment
rates.1 However, in most of these studies minimum wages are not modeled separately but aggre-
gated in a general measure of labor market flexibility, and employment effects are analyzed on macro
data.
The main claim of the paper is that it is prohibitively expensive for firms to employ workers for
short workweeks at a minimum wage when the labor market is inflexible due to fixed employment
costs. Thus, employers offer contracts that specify a minimum number of hours to be worked. This
results in a shift in the distribution of hours for the available jobs in the market, restricting the number
of part-time jobs. Part-time jobs play a crucial role in participation decisions of marginal workers,
especially women, since women may prefer flexibility with regard to hours of work. Part-time jobs
in many cases serve as a gateway to full-time jobs and ease the transition from household production
to market work. Thus, for sufficiently high employment costs, a minimum wage makes it less likely
for the marginal workers to stay in the labor market.
1Please see Blanchard (2005) for a detailed review of the history of unemployment in Europe and the literature it
inspired.
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Over the last fifty years, participation rates among Turkish women declined significantly. They
have stayed unexpectedly low over the last couple of decades, especially in urban areas. This pattern
is inconsistent with the general worldwide trend of female labor force participation and social and
demographic improvements in Turkey. This paper proposes that Turkish women have low partic-
ipation rates due to the extreme scarcity of part-time jobs, resulting from the constraints on hours
implied by the interaction of the minimum wage and market inflexibilities. While the share of part-
time employment among females averages around twenty-five percent in OECD countries, in Turkey
only 3.5 percent of employed women hold part-time positions. This paper shows that, indeed, if there
were fewer restrictions on work hours, the Turkish female labor force participation rate would have
been about six times higher.
Card and Krueger (1995) look at the proportion of workers that were full-time in their New
Jersey-Pennsylvania study and they document an increase in full time job incidence in New Jersey
(where the minimum wage increase happens). However, to my knowledge there is no other study
which looks at the relationship between part-time jobs and the minimum wage.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces theoretical model. The third
section gives the econometric specification of the model. Section 4 provides background on female
labor force participation behavior in Turkey. Section 5 explains the details of estimation, and re-
ports the estimation results. Section 6 provides counterfactual simulations and discusses policy
implications. Section 7 concludes the paper.
II. MODEL
The model used in this paper builds on the labor supply model introduced in Moffitt (1982). In
this model each worker faces a restriction on the lowest number of hours she can work: her required
minimum hours. She also chooses her desired number of hours, which she can work only if her
desired workweek is longer than her required minimum. If her desired workweek is shorter than her
required minimum she is considered to be "constrained" and has to choose between working more
hours than she wants or not working.
I extend this base model by modeling the marginal productivity determination and letting wages
vary by the length of workweek. Since, the per hour fixed cost of employment decreases as the
workweek gets longer, average productivity gets higher. Thus, employers are willing to pay higher
hourly wages for longer workweeks, which generates a full-time wage premium within the model.
The addition of increasing average productivities and the zero profit condition to the model leads to
a different modeling of the constraints on working hours.
In Moffitt’s model, if the difference between the required minimum and the desired length of
workweek is greater than some estimated level,D, the worker chooses not to work when constrained.
This D is a function of the shape of the individuals’ indifference curves, but is treated as constant
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across workers in Moffitt’s model. In my model, instead of estimating such a constant, I allow
workers to make utility comparisons when constrained, and choose the utility maximizing option
from this constrained set. Thus, I allow D to vary across individuals.
I will introduce the model in two subsections: the first subsection analyses how the interaction of
the minimum wage and fixed costs results in constraints on hours. The second subsection explains
how supply side decisions are affected by these constraints. Table 1 summarizes the notation used.
Table 1: Notation
π : Marginal productivity of the potential worker
f : Fixed cost of employment per week per employee (dollars)
wh : Hourly wage = average productivity
µ
wh =
πh− f
h
< π
¶
wmin : Minimum hourly wage
h∗ : Desired hours (length of workweek maximizing potential worker’s utility)
L∗ : Optimal level of leisure (h*+L*=T=weekly time endowment)
h0 : Required minimum hours⎛
⎜⎜⎝
Hours of work required for a worker to produce the value of
the minimum wage on average per hour. Required minimum hours is the
h that solves wmin=
πh− f
h
that is h0=
f
πi−wmin
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
h00 : Absolute required minimum hoursµ
=
f
π
. This is also the required minimum hours when there is no minimum wage
¶
A. Demand Side-Sources of the Constraints on Hours of Work
Consider an economy where technology is linear and labor is the only input of production. Each
potential worker has a constant marginal productivity (π). Given such a technology, firms will offer
everyone jobs with working hours they optimally choose to supply (h∗) at an hourly wage (wh)
equal to their average productivity, which is equal to their marginal productivity (wh = π).
Now, consider two individuals with different marginal productivities (πa > πb) but the same
level of desired hours. Any given firm will hire them both and pay hourly wages (wh) equal to
their average productivities, wha = πa and whb = πb respectively. However, if there is a minimum
wage in this economy (suppose it is set at a level between whb and wha), no worker with an average
productivity less than the minimum wage (πb = whb < wmin) will be offered any job. Since average
productivities are constant, there will be no constraints on the hours worked by the individuals who
are offered jobs. That is, a worker with productivity πa can still work her desired level of hours.
Nevertheless, an individual with a productivity πb will no longer be employed by anybody.
Suppose now there are costs associated with each job equal to f dollars per worker for each
workweek. As a result, each worker starts producing a surplus value for the employer after the first
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π
hours. I call this "the absolute required minimum hours" and denote it by h00. The key point
in this model is the increasing average productivity: the cost of employment will make a worker’s
average productivity, as well as the hourly wage she earns, dependent on the number of hours she
works. This hourly wage is less than what it is when there are no fixed costs since now the total
value of the workers production will be reduced by the costs associated with her employment 2. The
average hours curve in Figure 1 shows us the "menu" of jobs (defined as a pair of working hours and
an hourly wage) the worker will consider in her utility maximization.
However, minimum wage regulation is such that it does not take the existence of fixed costs into
account and requires a constant hourly wage independent of the length of the workweek (wmin)3.
Therefore, when there are fixed costs, minimum wage regulation creates an interval of hours where
the average productivity is lower than the minimum wage for every worker. This results in restric-
tions on the minimum number of hours each worker can work (h0). That is, some of the jobs (jobs
with hours less than h0) in the "menu" the worker considers will no longer be offered to her by the
employers. Solving the hourly wage equation for the h where average productivity is equal to the
minimum wage gives
h0i =
f
πi −wmin
(1)
which is an increasing function of the fixed employment cost and the minimum wage, but a decreas-
ing function of the worker’s productivity. Figure 1 illustrates how the minimum number of hours that
a certain worker needs to supply decreases as the productivity level increases (πa > πc > wmin =⇒
h0a < h0c). In other words, worker with a higher productivity will have more options on her "menu
of jobs" with a wider range of hours.
2wh =
πh− f
h
< π
3In this paper, minimum wage is set to be an hourly wage for two reasons. First, most of the relevant literature works
with data where the minimum wage is hourly. Second, the employment effects implied by this model will be in the same
direction but magnified if the minimum wage was set in any other manner, like as a weekly or a monthly minimum wage.
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B. Supply Side-Participation Decision with Constraints on Working Hours
Suppose that on the supply side of the labor market, there are individuals maximizing the util-
ity function U = U(Ci, hi ; Ai, 1i, 2i) choosing the amount of work hours (h∗i ) they want to
supply and the level of a composite market good (C∗i ) they want to consume given their individual
observable characteristics (Ai) and the unobservable heterogeneity in terms of hours preference and
productivity (1i, 2i).
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If the potential worker wants to supply a higher number of hours than she is required as a mini-
mum, she will not be restricted. However, even a worker with productivity higher than the minimum
wage will face unemployment if she has a low taste for work (or higher opportunity cost of working).
Figure 2 demonstrates this situation, showing two workers with the same productivity−π (slope of
the line CEG) which is higher than the minimum wage (slope of the line BEF )− but different
levels of desired hours h∗high and h
∗
low. An individual with desired hours equal to h
∗
high will not
be constrained by the demand side. However, an individual with h∗low will face the choice between
working h0(corresponding to the corner labeled E) and not working at all (the corner labeled B)
since she will not be offered her optimal job any more.
The above discussion shows that a minimum wage can have significant employment reducing
effects when there are high fixed costs. Moreover, these effects are felt more severely by low-
productivity individuals, since lower productivity implies a higher required minumum hours. Indi-
viduals with a low taste for market work (or high opportunity cost) who supply less hours to the
market will also be affected more by the minimum wage in this market.
III. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
In the model, there are workers who work their desired hours and workers who work their re-
quired minimums. Moreover, there are three groups of non-workers. The first group consists of
the ones who willingly opt out of the labor market regardless of the minimum wage. The second
group includes the ones who choose not to work the long hours they are offered. The third group
is the group of non-workers who wants to work, but are not offered any jobs because their marginal
productivity is less than the minimum wage. The main econometric difficulty arises from the fact
that it is not possible to observe which workers are at their required lower bounds and which are
working their desired hours. Moreover, I cannot observe which non-participants are constrained and
would like to supply positive hours and which would not. I only know who is working and who is
not, and the actual working hours for each worker. I assume the behavioral structure producing the
observed behavior and utilize the model to recover the parameters that maximize its fit. I start by
assuming that everybody has the following utility function,
U(Ci, Li; Ai, i) =
µ
α2(T − Li)− α1
α22
¶
exp
µ
α2 (α0+α2Ci + α3Ai + 1i)− α1
α2hi − α1
¶
which is maximized subject to the following set of constraints4
4Ci =Mi + wihhi =⇒ Ci =Mi +
³
πihi−γif
hi
´
hi =⇒ Ci =Mi + πihi − γif.
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Ci =Mi + πihi − γif
Li + hi = T
where Ai is a vector of demographic characteristics, Mi is non-labor income, Ci is the composite
good (the numeraire), Li is leisure and T is the fixed weekly time endowment that can be divided
between leisure and work. γi is a dummy which is equal to 1 if the individual works and 0 if
not. This "weird" utility function is chosen because it gives a linear labor supply function which is
widely used in the literature. That is, conditional on choosing to work a positive number of hours,
the optimal number of working hours is given by the following expression:
h∗i = T − L∗i = α0 + α1πi + α2(Mi − f) + α3Ai + i1 (2)
Restrictions α1 > α2h∗i and α2 ≤ 0 guarantee quasiconcavity of the utility function and its
monotonocity in disposable income. While α1 > α2h∗i implies that the compensated wage ef-
fect is non-negative, the uncompensated wage effect, α1, can be positive or negative.5 The second
constraint α2 6 0 assures that leisure is not inferior.
Marginal productivity is given by the following equation
πi = exp(Xiβ + i2) (3)
where Xi represents individual productivity characteristics. The error terms 1 and 2 are assumed
to be independently distributed as normals with means equal to zero and standard deviations equal
to σ1 and σ2 respectively.
If an individual desires to work a positive number of hours, has marginal productivity greater
than the minimum wage, and has higher utility from working her required minimum hours than not
working, she actively participates. Otherwise she does not work. As stated earlier, I do not observe
either h∗ or h0. However, if the individual is active in the labor market, I know hi, the observed
working hours. Since, in this model, hi is either desired hours or minimum required hours, I can use
the conditions governing the participation decision, to construct the rules determining the choice of
work hours. Figure 3 illustrates the regions regarding participation behavior in the plane of “desired”
This budget constraint can also be used to model fixed costs that are directly incurred by the employees facing a single
wage offer (π) and choosing how much to work at the hourly wage net of the fixed costs (wh). With the production
technology used in this paper, these two models will give identical results with the same interpretation.
5See Hausman(1980) or Pencavel (1986)
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and “required minimum” hours. 6
As long as the individual desires longer workweeks than the minimum workweek that she is
offered, she is not constrained by the minimum hours requirement and she works her desired hours.
However, when the desired length of her workweek, given that it is more than zero, is shorter than
the minimum offered to her, she is forced to choose between not working and working the required
minimum. She works h0 hours at minimum wage7 only if it is more desirable to do so than not
working. That is,
hi = h∗i if h∗i > h0 and πi > wmin (I)8
= h0 if h0 > h∗i and U(hi = h0) > U(hi = 0) (II)
45O
         
                           Required Minimum Hours (h0)             
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                                          Region III  
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too high 
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Figure 3
6See the first section in the appendix for an illustration of the hours choice using the utility function.
7Minimum wage is equal to the (minimum) hourly wage at the required minimum hours.
8This constraint means that the worker will only be offered a job with a positive wage if her productivity is greater
than the minimum wage. This constraint is imposed for technical reason during the optimization since if πi < wmin then
h0 < 0 and is less than h∗. By imposing this constraint, I can substitute minimum wage as a wage for the job that comes
with minimum required hours since minimum wage is equal to the (minimum) hourly wage at the required minimum
hours.
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Similarly, there are three groups among the non-participants. The first group is the group of
individuals who would supply positive hours if they were not constrained. They are asked to work
longer hours than they are willing to supply. When facing this set of choices, they prefer not to
participate. On the other hand, for the second group of non-participants, the desired workweek is
less than or equal to zero. They are the ones who willingly choose not to participate. The last group
of non-workers consists of individuals who are undesirable in the market when there is a minimum
wage, that is, their productivity is lower than the minimum wage. In summary,
hi = 0 if h0 > h∗i > 0 but U(hi = h0) < U(hi = 0) (III)
or if πi > wmin but h∗i ≤ 0 (IV )
or if πi < wmin (V )
Given these regions of participation, the probability of working hi = h hours can be written as
probability of observing h either as h∗or as h0, that is
Q =
⎛
⎜⎝
Pr(hi = h∗, h∗i > h0 > 0 |Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wmin, Mi)
+Pr
"
h = h0, h0 > h∗i > 0, U(hi = h0)
> U(hi = 0)|Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wmin, Mi
# ⎞⎟⎠
The probability of not working, on the other hand, is the combined probability of being in regions
III , IV or V and can be formulized as
q =
⎛
⎜⎝
Pr(h0 > h∗i > 0, U(hi = h0) < U(hi = 0)|Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wmin,Mi)
+Pr(h∗i = 0 , πi > w
min|Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wmin,Mi)
+Pr(wmin > πi |Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wmin,Mi)
⎞
⎟⎠
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Thus9, the log likelihood function, logL, is
logL =
X
h>0
logQ+
X
h=0
log q
I estimate the model using Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL). This method replaces the
actual probabilities defining the likelihood function with simulated ones. The simulated probabilities
are generated by a Logit-Smoothed Accept-Reject Simulator (LS-AR Simulator).
IV. FEMALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN TURKEY
Despite the demographic and social changes over the last 50 years, the female labor force par-
ticipation rate has decreased significantly in Turkey over this period. The female labor force par-
ticipation rate was 72 percent in 1955 but declined to 23 percent in February 2005. In 2005, the
participation rate was only 18 percent among urban women (SIS HLFS, 2005). Over this same pe-
riod, participation rates of women on average doubled worldwide, and almost tripled for married
women in most countries going through similar social changes.
The initial drop in the participation rate has been attributed to the massive urbanization of the
workforce after the 1950s. Small scale, family-level agriculture had been employing nearly all of
the women in rural areas. Since the distinction between household duties and work is blurred in
agriculture, it is easier for rural women to meet the conditions to be considered as employed. It
has been argued that when women move to the cities, they cannot find a place for themselves in the
labor force of urban Turkey (Dayioglu, 1998; Ozar, 1996; Tunali, 1997). In cities, market work and
household duties are incompatible. Hence, women have to concentrate on one of them. Most of
these women have little human capital, so they are employed in “marginal” jobs. Faced with this,
most choose not to participate in the workforce. However, the continuing decline in the participation
rate is unexpected since the social status of women has improved significantly over these years.
There is no study yet that provides a convincing explanation why the Turkish economy is in-
capable of utilizing the increasing productivity of women. The model developed in this paper is
estimated with Turkish female labor force data and explains the low participation rates among urban
females through constraints on hours in the job market, i.e. the lack of part-time jobs.
This is not the first paper that calls attention to the link between the lack of part-time jobs
and the low female labor force participation rate in Turkey (Baslevent, 2001). However, there is
9See the second section in the appendix for details of this derivation.
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no explanation for the scarcity of part-time jobs. The stylized model of a labor market analyzed
in this paper captures the fundamental characteristics of the Turkish labor market. According to
various OECD reports, Turkey is among the least flexible labor markets worldwide with regards to
employment. The main source of inflexibilities in this market are the policies regarding non-wage
monetary burdens associated with employment implied by the labor law which was in effect between
1947 and 2003, roughly the time period we are interested in. The absence of a linear relationship
between tax and benefit payments, and hours of work (Tunali, 2005) makes part-time employees
very undesirable in the Turkish labor market.
Women, while looking for a job, may prefer flexibility with regard to hours over pay. For exam-
ple, Falzone(2001) shows with US data that part-time work offers an efficient alternative for married
women in the labor market when earnings are not the only consideration. In most countries, part-
time positions are observed as low-pay, low-benefit jobs frequently occupied by women. However,
in Turkey, existing part-time jobs exhibit different characteristics as illustrated in Table 2. In the
Turkish labor market, part-time workers earn on average almost three times as much as full-time
workers.Tables 3 and 4 help clarify this picture. Most part-time workers are university graduates;
high productivity workers. The share of part-time workers is 31 percent among college graduate
women in my data. Among women with less education, on the other hand, this ratio is only 10 per-
cent. The summary statistics also show that the higher the years of schooling completed, the lower
the average number of hours worked per week. The model in this paper nicely fits these observations
and provides an explanation for the existence of "part-time wage premium" in the data.
Table 2: Wages - Part-time vs. Full-time Jobs
# of obs. mean st.dev. min. max. median
if h < 40 87 1.85 5.29 0.11 48.94 1.17
if h>=40 474 0.74 0.97 0.05 18.43 0.58
Table 3: Share of Part-timers and Education
# of obs. % part-timers
college graduates 154 31.13
non-college graduates 407 10.03
Table 4: Hours of Work and Schooling
# of obs. mean st.dev. min. max. median
primary school or less 189 42.79 9.03 15 84 40
middle school 35 42.48 4.68 40 58 40
high school 183 40.36 5.98 20 64 40
college 154 35.58 9.19 15 54 40
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This observation surprises many scholars and some even claim that there is a wage premium to part-
time jobs in Turkey. This interesting phenomenon can be explained with the model introduced in
this paper; average part time wages are higher simply because there are almost no part-time jobs
among the low paying jobs in the market.
V. ESTIMATION
A. Data
The data set used is from the Turkish Household Labor Force Supply Survey. This survey is
conducted biannually by the State Institute of Statistics of Turkey from 1988 to 1999, and quarterly
since 2000. In total, 14, 000 to 23, 000 households are surveyed each time, both from rural and urban
areas. The analysis here uses the data from the October 1988 round of this survey.
In the 1988 round, 102, 062 individuals residing in 22, 320 households nationwide are surveyed.
In this data set, participation for women is around 18 percent in cities, very similar to the census
results. Participation rates vary greatly with education and marital status. There are significant
drops in participation rates as education falls below college level (73 percent at the college level
and 8 percent for primary school graduates) and as women get married (38 percent for singles, 11
percent for married). In the survey, nonworking women are asked if they would like to work and the
ratio of those who are ready to start working is higher among married and low-educated (although
slightly in some cases) suggesting that more of those women are the ones who are staying out of the
market.
For the empirical analysis, I use a sub-sample of 6, 445 women between the ages of 20 and
55 who are married and living together with their husband in cities with 400, 000 or more people.
Women in the sample either did not work the week preceding the interview or they were employed
as wage and salary workers. I use data only on women who are working at most one job and who are
not currently enrolled in school, either full-time or part-time. Table 5 gives the descriptive statistics
for the women in my sample.
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics
Variables # of obs. mean st.dev. min. max. median
Hours worked (if working) 561 40.01 9.16 15 84 40
# of children of ages 0-5
(conditional on having a child)
2804 1.38 0.61 1 4 1
# of children of ages 6-14
(conditional on having a child)
3753 1.86 0.94 1 6 2
Education 6445 4.66 3.671 0 15 5
Age 6445 34.62 9.16 20 55 34
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In this sub-sample, the mean education is about five years. Seventy-four percent of the women in-
terviewed have seven or less years of schooling (last degree they have completed is primary school).
University graduates constitute six percent of the women and about thirty-seven percent of the work-
ers in the sub-sample. The labor force participation rate for this sub-sample is about nine percent.
These women work forty hours on average. Eighty-three percent of working women work forty
hours or more and only five percent work twenty hours or less (Eight percent of women work be-
tween twenty-five and forty hours, nine percent work less than twenty-five hours).
Table 6: Variable Definitions
Ai demographic variables
age between 20-55
squared age age squared/100
years of schooling 0 = no schooling
3 = literate but has no degree
5 = primary school
8 = middle school
11 = high school
15 = college or more
squared years of schooling years of schooling squared/100
young children number of children between ages 0-5
squared young children number of young children squared
older children number of children between ages 6-14
squared older children number of older children squared
Xi productivity variables
middle school dummy (0-1)
high school dummy (0-1)
college dummy (0-1)
potential experience age - years of schooling - 6
(6 is the age at schooling begins)
squared potential experience potential experience squared/100
Mi non-labor income
household income-own labor income
number of household members
I use different educational indicators, family variables and individual demographic indicators as
the explanatory variables in the estimation. Table 6 lists the variables used in all steps of estimation
with explanations. There are a few problems with the data; for example, wages and a non-labor
income measure are not directly available. There is also no record of asset income. I use the weekly
value of per member income of the household excluding women’s own earnings as a proxy for the
non-labor income. I only have monthly incomes recorded, thus I divide the figures by four to get
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an approximate weekly number. In the survey, individuals are asked their usual working hours per
week, and how much they worked last week. However, they report how much they earned in the
month preceding the interview. I approximate the weekly labor income using these figures, making
sure that the individuals were working for the whole month for which they report the income. Three
observations which are not meeting this criterion are excluded from the sample used for the analysis
The data set is cross-sectional and the nominal level of minimum wage is constant across the
country. I generate variations in the minimum wage using the province level CPI10. I keep the prices
in Ankara (the capital city) as the base and divide the minimum wage in the other provinces with
ratio of their prices to the prices in the capital. This measure reflects the differences in the real value
of minimum wage across individuals even though they all face the same nominal level. I made the
same adjustment to non-labor income and wage measures. I convert all values into US Dollars using
average Dollar/Turkish Lira exchange rate for October 1988, the month that the survey took place.
B. Results
Married women have higher-valued outside options since the division of labor in the household
requires them to be the main producers at home in most cultures. Thus, females of a given market
productivity are expected to supply fewer hours of labor than their male counterparts. These women
are also expected to make the non-participation decision more easily if they are forced to work
long hours. This is what we observe in the data. The share of housewives among non-participating
women is strikingly high in Turkish data; Seventy-nine percent of women who do not participate in
the labor force stated being a housewife as the reason. Household duties keep women at home when
the labor market options are not attractive enough. My estimates provide support to this not-so-new
idea. Looking at the Table 7 we can see that having young kids in the household decreases the
desired workweek. While having only one young child at the household reduces the desired hours
by little less than six hours, having two young children reduces desired hours by more than ten. The
effect of having older kids is similar on hours choice but its magnitude diminishes as the number of
children in this age group increases in the household. A woman who has a child between ages six
and fourteen wants to work about three hours less compared to her "twin" with no children of ages
six to fourteen.
The estimates of the marginal productivity parameters suggest significant economic returns to
education especially at the college and high school level. Everything else equal, college graduate
women earn about hundred percent more per hour compared to women with no education. The wage
return to a college education is more than double the wage return to a high school degree compared
to the women with no education. This partially explains the discrepancy between participation rates
across different education levels.
10I use 1995 prices, the earliest year for which CPI exists for all the provinces I have in the data.
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The mean of the productivity estimates is fifty-four cents for the working individuals. That is,
the average worker produces fifty-four cents worth of goods or services per hour. The distribution of
these productivity measures has a standard deviation of seventeen cents, with values ranging between
three cents and two dollar and thirty-four cents for the entire sample. According to these estimates,
nine percent of the women have simulated productivities that are less than the minimum wage level,
which ranges between thirty-two and thirty-four cents across fourteen cities.
The number of desired work hours decreases in non-labor income, but the effect is not very
significant economically. In this case, non-labor income is approximated using the labor incomes of
the other family members. The sum of family income excluding the wife’s income is divided by the
family size. Keeping this in mind, the estimate for α2 suggests that by every hundred extra dollars
the other family members earn per person the desired hours of a potential worker decreases by three
hours per week.
Table 7: MSL Estimates
Desired and Required Minimum Hours estimate st.dev
constant (α0) 21.49 3.82
wage (α1) 4.81 1.01
non-labor income (α2) -0.03 1.08E-03
years of schooling 0.88 0.09
squared years of schooling -3.55 0.65
age 0.84 0.17
squared age -1.67 0.25
young kids -2.47 0.77
older kids -3.49 0.42
squared young kids -2.71 0.59
squared older kids 0.52 0.17
fixed employment cost (f) 5.38 0.26
Marginal Product
constant -1.54 0.01
middle school 0.20 0.01
high school 0.44 0.02
college 0.93 0.03
potential experience 1.6E-03 3.03E-04
squared potential experience -5.4E-05 5.23E-06
σ1 8.11 0.09
σ2 0.42 0.01
log likelihood -3028
The coefficients on age variables imply that desired hours increases by age up to age thirty-three and
declines thereafter. Such a pattern in terms of hours worked does not appear in the data. However,
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we know that not all workers work their desired hours; according to the simulations about forty
percent of the workers are constrained to work at their required minimum. Given this, Figure 4
illustrates why we fail to observe such a pattern with hours data. The hours worked at the low and
high end of the age distribution is still high due to the higher proportion of constrained workers in
those age groups. In other words, because they have higher desired hours, a smaller proportion of
middle-aged workers are constrained.
Effect of Age on Desired Hours / Ratio of Constrained Workers by Age
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Figure 4
The estimate for α1 may seem to be small suggesting that a dollar increase in the wage will
increase the desired hours by five hours given the range of wage estimates. For the average worker
one extra dollar per hour is about a two hundred percent increase in hourly wages. This is in line with
the findings of several papers on Turkish female labor market activity. Tunali (1995), for example,
finds that the wage elasticity of hours supplied is almost zero among Turkish women.
The fixed employment cost is estimated to be about five dollars and forty cents. As mentioned
before, an average worker works forty hours per week and makes about fifty-four cents per hour.
In this case, five dollars and forty cents corresponds to about twenty-five percent of the weekly
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earnings. About thirty-one percent of all labor costs in Turkey(in 1990) was non-wage payments.11
C. Participation Regions
The estimated participation rate from the model is 8.87 percent. Table 8 summarizes the partici-
pation probabilities associated with regions in Figure 3. According to these estimates, eighty percent
of all women are restricted in the sense that they want to supply positive hours of work but either are
not desired as workers or are constrained by high required minimum hours. Conditional on being a
non-participant, about twenty-five percent of women want to work and are welcome in the market,
but are asked to work more hours than they are willing to supply. About sixty percent of women are
not offered any job.
Table 8: Participation Regions
Event Definition Probability
h>0 participation 0.09
h=h∗ working desired hours - Region I 0.04
h=hmin working required minimum - Region II 0.05
wmin<π, h∗>0, h=0 required minimum too high - Region III. 0.25
wmin<π, h∗<0, h=0 not want to work - Region IV 0.04
wmin>π no job offer - Region V 0.62
D. Fitting the Hours Distribution
Table 9 reports the distribution of the estimated hours. In the simulated data, the average length
of the workweek is about forty-one hours. For the women working their required minimum hours,
the mean workweek is forty-seven hours long, and for women working their desired hours the mean
workweek is thirty-five hours.
Table 9: Distribution of Hours
mean st.dev. min max
estimated 40.61 13.52 8.54 89.67
h=h0 46.81 15.31 13.64 89.67
h=h∗ 34.88 8.19 8.54 61.34
11TISK(Turkish Employer’s Unions Confederation) Website. www.tisk.org.tr
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Figure 5 graphs the simulated hours distribution and also shows the distributions for the restricted
and unrestricted workers. The relatively high concentration of workweeks around thirty to forty
five hours can be considered as a possible explanation for the concentration of the hours distribution
around forty hours in the data.
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VI. COUNTERFACTUALS
Given the estimates and the data I can simulate the participation and hours choices under differ-
ent minimum wage policies. Moreover, I can see how the participation and hours choices could have
been with the same minimum wage in a different economic environment, in this case, a labor market
with no employment costs. Based on the estimates, I simulate several counterfactual scenarios and
analyze transitions across labor market groups under these alternative policies. Table 10 contains
the participation probabilities generated via simulations under these counterfactuals.
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Table 10: Participation Regions under Counterfactuals
f=festimate, wmin=0
h>0 participation 0.48
wmin<π, h∗<0, h=0 not want to work 0.09
f=0.5*festimate, wmin=wmindata
h>0 participation 0.15
wmin<π, h∗>0, h=0 required minimum too high 0.19
wmin<π, h∗<0, h=0 not want to work 0.04
wmin>π no job offer 0.62
f=0.5*festimate, wmin=0
h>0 participation 0.75
wmin<π, h∗<0, h=0 not want to work 0.09
If the minimum wage is zero (in the presence of the fixed cost), the ratio of women working increases
to 48 percent while only 9 percent of women do not want to work.
The fixed cost in this model represents not only technological burdens but also policy-implied
costs of employment. Thus, although it is not reasonable to think of an environment without any
fixed employment costs, we can think of an environment sans the institutional costs imposed by the
regulations, taxes etc. About fifteen percent of women participate when fixed costs are reduced
by fifty percent. If there were no constraints in the market, the simulations show that about 60
percent of currently non-working women would obtain jobs. This would increase total female labor
force participation to 75, about 9 times the current estimated rate. A simulation without fixed
costs indicates that the minimum wage alone explains 42 percent of this total increase. Similarly,
a simulation including fixed costs but no minimum wage shows that fixed costs account for only
7 percent of the change. Thus, the interaction of the minimum wage with fixed employment costs
accounts for most of the difference.
These changes also affect the distribution of working hours. Table 11 shows that the mean,
minimum, and maximum hours worked are lower, indicating more women are working at the low
end of hours distribution. This supports the claim that if there were more part time jobs available in
the market participation would have been higher.
Table 11: Counterfactual Distribution of Hours
mean st.dev. min max
f=festimate,wmin=0 31.91 7.78 10.28 68.62
f=f=0.5*festimate,wmin=wmindata 36.08 12.05 5.99 89.72
f=f=0.5*festimate,wmin=0 28.76 8.56 5.14 68.54
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I show that the interaction of minimum wages and fixed costs of employment
imposes limits on offered working hours and as a result can cause a shortage of part-time jobs.
Thus, for sufficiently high employment costs, the institution of a minimum wage affects employment
among all workers who prefer flexibility in terms of hours regardless of the productivity level. I
estimate the model with Turkish data. My estimates indicate that about 80 percent of all women
in Turkey are restricted; they wish to supply positive hours of work, but either have lower than
minimum wage productivities and thus are not desired as workers or are constrained by required
minimum hours. The key parameter in the model is the fixed cost of employment, which is estimated
to be about 5 dollars per week for each employee. The average worker in the sample works forty
hours per week and makes about 54 cents per hour. The 5 dollars fixed cost thus corresponds to
about 25 percent of weekly earnings. Given that on average 30 percent of all labor costs in Turkey
are non-wage expenses12, this estimate is a good approximation.
With counterfactual simulations I show that if there were no constraints in the market, total
female labor force participation would increase ninefold. About 65 percent of this new participants
hold part time jobs. A simulation without fixed costs indicates that the minimum wage alone
explains 42 percent of this total increase and a simulation including fixed costs but no minimum
wage shows that fixed costs account for only 7 percent of the change. These results support the
claim that the impact of the minimum wage is strongest when it is imposed in inflexible market
conditions.
There are several assumptions in the model that may be considered restrictive. For example, in
the current functional specification of the model, there is no place for a non-monotonic relationship
between hours supplied and fixed costs. Moreover, there is no room for non-linear responses to
wages. Implications of the model for employment decisions do not change if the technology is
modified in order to allow alternative constraints and wage structures. For example, an S-shaped
hours-productivity relationship (Barzel, 1973; Moffitt, 1984), which is considered a more realistic
approach, would lead to both lower and upper bounds on the length of workweeks acceptable to
the employers. This would strengthen the impact of minimum wage on the level of employment
even without the fixed costs. In the data, the distribution of hourly wages by workweek is weakly
concave, which rejects the idea of a full-time wage premium. I take this as a sign that this model is a
reasonable choice for the environment. It implies that part time jobs will be in short supply and high
productivity workers will occupy the existing jobs. Low productivity workers will be constrained
with higher working hours. Thus, in this environment, the part-time job market may have higher
hourly wages on average than the full-time job market. This is quite different from the markets that
12SIS statistic
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are explained with S-shaped budget constraints.
Allowing constraints only on the minimum number of hours workers can work, may also seem
limiting. However, an upper limit on working hours does not seem to be an issue in the data. More-
over, I choose not to discretize the choice set of hours, unlike some other studies in the literature,
since the main concern is not fitting the distribution of observed hours (mainly the spikes at certain
length of workweeks, like 40 hours) but understanding how important these constraints are in ex-
plaining the concepts of voluntary and involuntary unemployment. I cannot capture the spikes of
observed hours distribution with the estimates. However, model successfully fits the external mar-
gins of participation. I also ignore possible heterogeneity of fixed costs due to the lack of variables
needed to identify such variation across workers.
This paper offers a stylized model of employment costs. The model restricts the usage of infor-
mation on employers since this information does not exist for non-workers, thus cannot be used to
approximate the latent indices created for each individual. Estimating the model only on workers
can improve this aspect of the estimates. However, workers constitute a minority in this data set,
which reduces the power of estimation. Thus, the next step is to estimate the model on a data set
where employment rates are higher, like the Current Population Survey data. In the mean time, the
data set can be enriched by inclusion of single females and maybe males. Married women make
non-participation decision easier compared men and single women since they usually have a higher
non-labor income to rely on compared to their husbands. It will be interesting to model household
as the unit of analysis and estimate the impact that the minimum wages and market inflexibilities
have on the intra-household division of labor. Turkish married men work on average 52 hours in my
data. This is very high compared to many other countries.
In this model productivity is perfectly observed by employers, and wages are based on produc-
tivity. This kind of model of the labor market has been used before to consider minimum wage
impacts, dating back to Stigler in the 1940s. It has been criticized before, because it doesn’t account
for the spike of the wage distribution at the minimum wage (Card and Kreuger, 1995). The model
introduced in this paper doesn’t suffer from the criticism of Card and Kreuger. One implication of
my model is that, while it’s based on a Stigler-type view of the labor market, it still ends up with
a spike at the minimum, without raising anyone’s wages (I see this in the Turkish data - an impres-
sive 48 percent of the blue collar workers are reported to be working at the minimum wage level).
This model also can be used as an explanation for high rates of minimum wage noncompliance – if
the alternative is being unable to work workers would not complain if they’re being paid below the
minimum wage when job comes with flexible hours.
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APPENDIXES
I. UTILITY FUNCTION AND WORK DECISION
Following two graphs show the relationship between the work hours and the utility, keeping
everything else constant for two different individuals. Both individuals have the same characteristics,
except for the number of young kids. X-axis crosses the y-axis at U(h=0), that is at the utility level
from not working.
This first figure illustrates the utility function of an individual for whom not working is superior
to working at any h. This individual is not going to work at h∗, since this local maximum implies a
lower utility level than what he gets at h = 0.
Figure A-1
The following individual has the same characteristics with the above individual except the num-
ber of young kids. As you can see the absolute required minimum is same for both individuals since
only the productivity variables affect the location of this minimum. Unlike the above case, there is
a positive h for this individual where her utility is maximized. She will work h∗ (point C) if the
require minimum hours is between points B and C. She will work her required minimum hours if
the minimum is between C and D (note that for these points utility is higher than what it is at h = 0).
If the required minimum is more than D, she will not work, since now not working gives a higher
utility compared to working at hmin
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Figure A-2
II. DERIVATION OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION
The individual’s problem is to maximize
U = U(Ci, Li; Ai, i)
=
µ
α2(T − Li)− α1
α22
¶
exp
µ
α2 (α0+α2Ci + α3Ai + 1i)− α1
α2hi − α1
¶
subject to the following set of constraints
Ci ≤Mi + γ(πihi − f)
Li + hi 6 T
whereAi is a vector of demographic characteristics,Mi is non-labor income andCi is the composite
good (the numeraire), Li is leisure, and T is the fixed weekly time endowment that can be divided
between leisure and work. γ is a dummy which is equal to 1 if the individual works and 0 if not.
Solution to this optimization problem gives
h∗i = T − L∗i = α0 + α1πi + α2(Mi − f) + α3Ai + i1
as the desired hours equation. This model has two more latent indexes:
πi = Xiβ + i2
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hminij =
f
πi −wminj
Then for a worker
hi = h∗i (works desired hours) if
h∗i > h
min
ij and πi > wminj
hi = hminij (works required minimum hours ) if
0 < h∗i < h
min
ij and U(hi = hminij ) > U(hi = 0)
hi = 0 (desires to work but is restricted) if
0 < h∗i < h
min
ij and U(hi = hminij ) < U(hi = 0)
hi = 0 (does not want to work but is offered a job) if
h∗i ≤ 0 and πi > wminj
and
hi = 0 (can not work-no job is offered) if
πi < wminj
Then the log-likelihood function is:
logL =
X
h>0
logQ+
X
h=0
log q
where
Q =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Ã
k(h| Region I , Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj , Mi)
Pr( Region I |Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj , Mi)
!
+Ã
k(h| Region II, Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj , Mi)
Pr( Region II |Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj , Mi)
!
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
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and
q =
⎛
⎜⎝
Pr(Region III |Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj , Mi)
+Pr(Region IV |Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj ,Mi)
+Pr(Region V |Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj , Mi)
⎞
⎟⎠
(k(.) is the conditional probability density function of the hours of work variable given dependent
variables, non-labor income and minimum wage levels and the unobserved preference and produc-
tivity shocks).
k(h|Region I, .) =
Φ
∙
(hi−f)Xiβ−wminj hi√
(f−hi)2 σ22
¸
φ
∙
hi−α0−(α1−α2f)Xiβ−α2Mi−α3Ai√
(α1−α2f)2 σ22+ σ21
¸
1√
(α1−α2f)2 σ22+ σ21
Pr(0 < hminij < h
∗, U(h = hminij ) > U(h = 0) |Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj ,Mi)
k(h|Region II, .) =
[Φ (Z1) − Φ(Z2)] (
wminj f
(hi − f)2σ2
) φ (
wminj
hi
hi − f
− Xiβ
σ2
)
Pr(0 < h∗i < h
min
ij , U(hi = h
min
ij ) > U(hi = 0) |Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj ,Mi)
where
Z1 =
log
³
α1−α2hi
α1
´
[(α1−α2hi) (α1)]− α22α0hi − α32hiMi −α22α3Aihi + α2α1hi − α22α1wminj hi
α22hiσ1
and
Z1 =
hi−α0−(α1−α2f)Xiβ−α2Mi−α3Ai−(α1−α2f)
"
wminj
hi
hi − f
−Xiβ
#
σ1
And
q =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Pr
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
³
α2hminij − α1
´
exp
µ
α2(α0+α2Mi+α2hminij wminj +α3Ai+1i)−α1
α2hminij −α1
¶
<
(−α1) exp
³
α2(α0+α2Mi+α3Ai+1i)−α1
−α1
´
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
, h∗i > 0,
π > wminj |Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj ,Mi
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+Pr
h
h∗i < 0, π > w
min
j | Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj ,mi
i
+Pr
h
π < wminj | Xi, Ai, σ1, σ2, wminj ,Mi
i
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
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=⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Pr
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
³
α2hminij − α1
´
exp
µ
α2(α0+α2m+α2hminij wminj +α3Ai+1i)−α1
α2hminij −α1
¶
<
(−α1) exp
³
α2(α0+α2Mi+α3Ai+1i)−α1
−α1
´
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
, Xiβˆ − wminj > −2i,
α0 + (α1 − α2f)Xiβˆ + α2Mi + α3Ai > 1i + 2i(α1 − α2f)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+Pr
⎡
⎣ α0 + α1
³
Xiβˆ + i2
´
i
+ α2
³
Mi − f(Xiβˆ + i2)
´
i
+α3Ai + 1i < 0, Xiβˆ + i2 > wminj
⎤
⎦
+Pr
h
Xβˆ + i2 < wminj
i
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Pr
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
³
α2hminij − α1
´
exp
µ
α2(α0+α2Mi+α2hminij wminj +α3Ai+1i)−α1
α2hminij −α1
¶
<
(−α1) exp
³
α2(α0+α2Mi+α3Ai+1i)−α1
−α1
´
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
, Xiβˆ − wminj > −2i,
α0 + (α1 − α2f)Xiβˆ + α2Mi + α3Ai > 1i + 2i(α1 − α2f)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+Φ
∙
−[α0+(α1−α2f)Xiβˆ+α2Mi+α3Ai]√
σ21+(α1−α2f)σ22
, −Xiβˆ+w
min
j
σ2
¸
+Φ
∙
Xiβˆ−wminj
σ2
¸
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
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